Key Considerations for Security in your TIP
Sarah-Jane Prew
Security often receives a lot of attention following major attacks, but we need a regular and ongoing commitment to security planning and design in public projects. As the inquest progresses into the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017, there is a renewed focus on developing a holistic approach to the security of public spaces.
In the aftermath of the Manchester Arena bombing, there was much pressure to improve security at large venues, and upcoming legislation will reflect this. Security can feel like a daunting or scary task, but it is vital to take a sensible and holistic approach to any security requirements for public spaces.
Security planning and design is important within buildings as well as in our public realm. For example, in the Manchester Arena attack, the bomb was detonated inside the foyer of the arena – in a concourse area between the arena itself and the railway station. The attacker did not enter the arena, so ‘airport style’ entry screening suggested by many would not have stopped this attack.
As towns head back to holding major events and hosting crowds following the pandemic, planning and design decisions made now will affect longer-term security.
It may sound obvious, but entrance screening is an important step to preventing a potential attacker from gaining access to an event venue. But, to be effective, entrance screening requires some key considerations:
thought has to be given to the screening equipment chosen in order to offer risk based robust solutions for that venue – one size does not fit all.
staff have to be trained to use the equipment effectively.
asking people to queue outside a venue while waiting to be screened just displaces the threat elsewhere – outside the venue – which is an easier place to attack
the presence of screening can introduce a complacency that ‘security is in place’ which can reduce people’s state of awareness when it is offered as the only solution.
So, entry screening has to be done intelligently and alongside a myriad of other measures to be effective in protecting communities.
Security follows the Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation principle – the more layers you put in, the less likely it is that all the holes in the cheese will line up, leading to the accident or terror event.
Security outside a site’s perimeters is just as important as that within. Why? Because terrorists are increasingly looking for soft targets, and as long as there are crowds of people, those outside perimeters are more accessible targets.
While major events are largely on-hold due to COVID-19, it is still particularly important to plan for outdoor events. Street markets, al fresco dining and many indoor events which are moving outdoors should be made more COVID-19 secure. Relevant security adaptations should therefore be taken to ensure health and security are considered together (see previous blog on Protecting people in outdoor spaces).
Security en route from transport hubs to a venue or event is just as important as what happens inside, as is protecting queues of people waiting to enter and the overall public realm.
If local authorities are going to take the welcome step of insisting on security measures at venues, then an equivalent agreement addressing the aggregate responsibility of the wider area would be an equally significant enhancement for public safety and security.
Ensuring that security measures are clearly visible creates an impression that an area is well protected, making the public feel safe whilst also acting as a deterrent to any potential attacker.
Within this designed space, a venue can use a range of tools including town centre radio systems, good collaborative relationships with the Police and other emergency services, traffic control and officers (both uniformed and covert) monitoring and engaging with crowds approaching a venue. Add monitored CCTV on approach, with appropriate response, sniffer dogs, behavioural detection and a strong staff security with a challenge culture and the layers of cheese around the holes of vulnerability are getting thicker.
Space within the design of the public realm should be considered to manage pedestrian flow and accommodate the dynamic surveillance measures mentioned above.
Deterring or preferably preventing another Manchester Arena-type attack requires a multi-faceted intelligent approach, an understanding of risk, intelligent design of the public realm and the empowerment of people. It is this layered approach and a strong collaborative security culture that will ensure the best chance of protection and any legislation needs to reflect this.